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Introduction 
 
 
In recent years, there has been significant progress in advancing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) rights across Europe.1 At both the national, and supra-national (European Union 
(EU) and Council of Europe (COE)) levels, LGBT persons increasingly enjoy protections for their 
private sexual intimacy, ability to access and maintain employment, and state recognition of core 
identity, including legal affirmation of preferred gender and acknowledgment for loving relationships.2  
                                                          
 Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Bristol.  
1 See, e.g., Schalk & Kopf v. Austria,  53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2011) (same-gender couples falling within “family 
life” under art. 8 Eur. Comm’n H.R.); Vallianatos v. Greece,  59 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12 (2014) (equality in the 
provision of civil partnerships to same-gender and opposite-gender couples); Oliari v. Italy, 40 B.H.R.C. 549 
(2015) (right to same-gender relationship recognition in Italy); Goodwin v. United Kingdom,  35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
18 (2002) (right to legal gender recognition); Identoba v. Georgia 39 B.H.R.C. 510 (2015) (protection from 
homophobic violence and discrimination while demonstrating); X v. Turkey (App No. 24626/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., 
Oct.9, 2012) (protection from homophobic, inhuman, and degrading treatment in detention); EB v. France,  47 
Eur. H.R. Rep.21 (2008) (right for gay, lesbian. and bisexual persons to adopt); X v. Austria,  57 Eur. H.R. 
Rep.14 (2013) (prohibiting discrimination in non-marital second-parent adoption rules based on sexual 
orientation); Smith &Grady v. United Kingdom,  29 Eur. H.R. Rep.493 (2000) (rights of gay, lesbian and 
bisexual individuals in the armed forces); Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal,  31Eur. H.R. Rep. 47 (2001) 
(prohibiting discrimination in child custody decisions based on sexual orientation); Karner v. Austria,  38 Eur. 
H.R. Rep.24 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination in tenancy succession rights based on sexual orientation); 
Vejdeland et al. v. Sweden, 58 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (2014) (prohibition on homophobic serious and prejudicial 
allegations); Alekseyev v. Russia (App. Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08,  14599/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Nov. 21, 2010) 
(condemning ban on Gay Pride marches).  
2 For national law developments, see the introduction of same-gender marriage in twelve European states since 
2001 (Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Iceland and certain parts of the United Kingdom). See also movements towards self-determination 
   LGBT equality is not, however, being achieved equally across the European continent. In many 
western countries, same-gender marriage, non-discrimination guarantees and transgender protections 
are now standard. In 2015, Ireland became the first jurisdiction worldwide to introduce marriage 
equality by popular vote3, and trailblazing countries, such as Sweden, Malta, and Denmark, are 
redefining international best practice for sexuality and gender inclusiveness.4 Yet, in other parts of 
Europe, particularly nations located in the east, LGBT rights are not simply stagnating but, in many 
cases, are in fast retreat.5 Anti-gay “propaganda” laws, constitutional bans on gay marriage, and the 
enforcement of heteronormative “traditional family values” mean that, in jurisdictions such as 
Lithuania, Hungary, and Russia, LGBT communities remain a marginalised, frequently disempowered, 
minority.6 
 
                                                          
rights for transgender persons (Ireland, Malta, Sweden, Denmark and Norway) and the removal of medical 
intervention requirements (United Kingdom, Portugal, Netherlands, Germany, Spain). In the European Union, 
see the specific inclusion of sexual orientation non-discrimination protections in article 21 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Court of Justice of the European Union has also been 
instrumental in providing greater legal protections of transgender employees (P & S and Cornwall CC, [1996] 2 
C.M.L.R. 247), greater benefits for same-gender couples (Romer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg,  [2013] 2 
C.M.L.R. 11), Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Buhnen,  [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 32), and fairer asylum 
procedures for those who flee homophobic persecution (A, B & C v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en 
Justitie,  (2015) 1 W.L.R. 2141; X, Y & Z v. Minister voor en Asiel,  (2014) Q.B. 1111).  
3 Brian Tobin, Marriage Equality in Ireland: The Politico-Legal Context, 30 INT’L. J.  L., POL’Y & FAM. 115, 
126 -27(2016).   
4 Peter Dunne, Re-thinking Legal Gender Recognition: Recent Reforms in Argentina, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, 2015 1 INT’L FAM. L. 41.  
5 Helen Fenwick, Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court's Authority via Consensus Analysis?, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 248, 264-67; see also 
Ronald Holzhacker, State Sponsored Homophobia and the Denial of the Right of Assembly in Central 
and Eastern Europe: the "Boomerang" and the "Ricochet" Between European Organizations and Civil Society 
to Uphold Human Rights, 35( LAW & POL’Y 1 (2013).  
6 See generally Philip Ebels, MEPs Condemn Homophobia in Eastern Europe, EURO OBSERVER (May 24, 
2012), https://euobserver.com/lgbti/116371; Fenwick, supra note 5; ILGA-Europe, Rainbow Map 2016, ILGA-
EUROPE  (May 10, 2016) , http://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/Attachments/side_b-
rainbow_europe_index_may_2016_small.pdf; Graeme Reid, ‘‘Traditional Values” Code for Human Rights 
Abuse?, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ( Oct. 17,  2012),  https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/17/traditional-values-
code-human-rights-abuse1; Russia: Anti-LGBT Law a Tool for Discrimination: An Anniversary Assessment, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 29, 2014),  https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/29/russia-anti-lgbt-law-tool-
discrimination .  
This section of the article offers a “European” perspective on the rights of non-biological 
parents when their same-gender relationships come to an end. While the section focuses heavily on the 
European Convention of Human Rights – a core text which is applicable in 47 State Parties throughout 
the Council of Europe – the substantive content is strongly influenced by western-centric European 
norms.  
 
   The LGBT jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is highly 
contextual. The cases that the Strasbourg court has admitted for review, as well as the force of its 
individual judgments, often depend on the political climate in each jurisdiction. According to Helen 
Fenwick, the ECtHR, like other national and international adjudicatory bodies, derives its institutional 
legitimacy from State Parties accepting, and properly implementing, the judges’ rulings.7 Therefore, the 
Court is cautious in recognising greater sexual orientation and gender identity rights in order to 
“maintain its own credibility and authority which would be threatened if it developed rights to such 
recognition that a number of states would be likely to greet with hostility and resistance.”8 Put simply: 
a statement as to the extensive “family life” rights of non-biological parents in Germany or Belgium is 
unlikely to encourage meaningful reform for LGBT families in Russia or Ukraine. Indeed, in the 
ECtHR’s recent landmark judgment, Oliari v. Italty (finding a requirement for same-gender civil 
partnership rights it Italy), the Court was careful to ground its’ observations on the particular legal and 
political characteristics of Italian society.9 The judges were no doubt aware that such a right, if applied 
generally across the Council of Europe, would be largely unenforceable.    
 
 It is also important to acknowledge, while addressing the relationship of lesbian, gay and 
bisexual parents to their children, that the status of young persons – both queer-identified youth and 
children in LGB families – has been comparatively absent from modern European discourse. While 
contemporary debates in the United States increasingly explore child-centred topics, such as sexual 
                                                          
7 Fenwick, supra note 5, at248.  
8 Id.  
9 40 B.H.R.C. 549, ¶¶ 165–187 (2015). See also Andy Hayward, Same-Sex Registered Partnerships – A Right to 
Be Recognized?, 75 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 27, 29-30 (2016); Paul Johnson, Ground-Breaking Judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Oliari and Others v. Italy: Same-Sex Couples in Italy Must Have Access to 
Civil Unions/Registered Partnerships, ECHR SEXUAL ORIENTATION BLOG (July 21, 2015), 
http://echrso.blogspot.ie/2015/07/ground-breaking-judgment-of-european.html. 
orientation change efforts 10 and transgender access to school bathrooms,11 European litigation and 
legislative strategies have (with notable exceptions discussed below) focused on more traditional adult-
centered rights: family life, freedom of assembly, and conditions for obtaining legal gender recognition. 
To a certain extent, this may be a strategic move. Given historic (and contemporary) 
mischaracterisations of LGB identities as a threat to children12, advocates may prefer to avoid debates 
about either youth expression of LGB identities or youth exposure to non-heteronormative parental 
structures.  
 
 There is considerable evidence that, while Europe’s population is, as a whole, more comfortable 
with homosexuality and formal gay relationships, there remains significant opposition to the 
construction, and accommodation, of lesbian, gay and bisexual families.13 Aware of the particular public 
sensitivity surrounding “gay parenting,” the UK Parliament introduced a right to same-gender adoption 
two years in advance of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. Under s. 49 of the Children and Adoption Act 
2002 (the Adoption Act), “[a]n application for an adoption order may be made by . . . a couple” which 
was defined as “two people (whether of different sexes or the same sex) living as partners in an enduring 
family relationship.”14 By resolving the parenting rights of LGB persons prior to addressing legal 
relationship recognition, Parliament was able to politically separate these issues and, thus, avoid the 
highly-emotive, child-oriented arguments, which dominated relationship recognition campaigns in 
                                                          
10 John M Satira, Determining the Deception of Sexual Orientation Change Efforts,  58 WILLIAM & MARY L. 
REV. 641 (2016); Jacob M Victor, Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The California Approach, Its 
Limitations, and Potential Alternatives,  123 YALE L.J. 1532 (2014).  
11 Catherine Jean Archibald, Transgender Bathroom Rights, 24 DUKE J.GENDER, L. &POL’Y 1 (2016); Jess 
Bravin, Virginia School Board Asks Supreme Court to Block Order on Transgender Bathroom Use,  2016-2017 
SUPREME CT. PREVIEW 277.  
12 Anna L Weissman, Repronormativity and the Reproduction of the Nation-State: The State and Sexuality 
Collide, JOURNAL OF GLBT FAMILY STUDIES 1, 17 (2016); teve Baldwin, Child Molestation and the 
Homosexual Movement,  14 REGENT U. L. REV. 267 (2001-02); Olga Khazan, Milo Yiannopoulos and the Myth 
of the Gay Pedophile, ATLANTIC (Feb. 21,  2017),  https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/02/milo-
yiannopoulos-and-the-myth-of-the-gay-pedophile/517332/. 
13 Pedro Alexandre Costa et al., University Students’ Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Parenting and Gay and 
Lesbian Rights in Portugal, 61 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1667 (2014); Darrel Montero, Attitudes Toward Same-
Gender Adoption and Parenting: An Analysis of Surveys from 16 Countries, 15 ADVANCES  SOC. WORK 444, 
448-52 (2014). Judit Takacs, Ivett Szalma & Tama´s Bartus, Social Attitudes Toward Adoption by Same-Sex 
Couples in Europe, 45 ARCHIVES  SEXUAL BEHAV. 1787, 1794 (2016). 
14 Children and Adoption Act 2002 (the Adoption Act), §144(4). 
other European jurisdictions, such as France15 and Slovenia.16 In Italy, the recent Civil Unions Act 2016 
only secured sufficient parliamentary support when the government agreed to remove adoption 
entitlements for same-gender couples.17 Similarly, in Ireland, opponents of the 2015 marriage equality 
referendum largely avoided discussing same-gender intimacy, preferring instead to target social unease 
with same-gender parenting. Indeed, the two most prominent organisations campaigning against LGB 
marriage rights in Ireland were called “Mothers and Fathers Matter” and “First Families First.”18  
 
  The failure to more thoroughly address – both nationally and supra-nationally – the status of LGB 
families – particularly the legal rights of parents vis-à-vis their children – is regrettable and is likely to 
precipitate significant legal complications. Gay, lesbian and bisexual persons are increasingly having 
families in Europe, and they need a legal system that is sensitive and responsive to their needs. As the 
law currently stands, family law rules – which are grounded in an explicitly heterosexual, opposite-
gender norm – are ill-equipped to regulate the increasing numbers of families which, while perhaps de 
facto reproducing stereotypical social parenting, do not follow the same biological and legal patterns 
that normally exist where there is one mother, who gave birth, and one father, who provided sperm. The 
fear is that, if parental rights and responsibilities are linked to a duality of law and biology, same-gender 
persons, who fulfil an extensive social parenting role, but have no legal or biological connection to their 
children, may fall through the cracks.  
 
   This section of the article looks to existing ECHR norms and practice, and considers whether 
it is possible to identify individual principles and rules that can offer common-sense guidance in 
defining the contours of same-gender parent rights.  
 
 
I. Formally Recognizing LGB Families in Europe  
 
                                                          
15 Maxime Larivé, Understanding France’s Gay Marriage Battles, US NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 9, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/07/09/frances-politicization-of-gay-marriage-and-
gay-adoption..  
16 Slovenia Rejects Same-Sex Marriages in Referendum, IRISH TIMES  (Dec. 21, 2015),  
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/slovenia-rejects-same-sex-marriages-in-referendum-1.2473602.  
17 ILGA-Europe, Important Day as Italy Becomes the 27th European Country to Legally Recognise Same-Sex 
Couples, ILGA-EUROPE (May 11, 2016),  http://www.ilga-europe.org/resources/news/latest-news/italy-
recognises-same-sex-couples>.  
18 Mothers and Fathers Matter, There’s Far More to Marriage Than Just a Word,MOTHERS AND FATHERS 
MATTER, (2015), http://mothersandfathersmatter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Family-and-Life-marriage-
doc.pdf.  
 For Europe’s non-biological parents, the most direct way to formalise their parental status is to 
bring their relationship – with both their partner and their children – into a recognised legal structure. 
Throughout Europe, same-gender couples, whose relationships are acknowledged by the State, enjoy 
greater rights and have increased opportunity to create legal connections with the children that they are 
raising (whether biological or not). Where a non-biological parent can prove that there is a formal nexus 
between both parents and children, it is less likely that state authorities, including the judiciary, will 
wholly ignore that parent during subsequent custody disputes.  
 
A. Access to Marriage   
 
Twelve jurisdictions within the Council of Europe (as well as England, Wales, and Scotland19) 
permit same-gender marriage.20 Entering a marital union offers Europe’s LGB community the most 
direct means to formalise links between spouses and non-biological children. Since 2016, when 
Portugal enacted adoption reforms,21 all “marriage equality” countries in Europe permit same-gender 
spouses to jointly adopt children. The European countries that currently permit “gay marriage” are: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Norway, and Iceland (as well as parts of the UK).22   
    
Unlike in the United States, where Obergefell v. Hodges23 recognises a general marriage 
equality right, the European Convention on Human Rights does not require the allowance of same-
gender marriage.24 The ECtHR’s current position on LGB marriages was first expressed in Schalk & 
                                                          
19 In Northern Ireland, relationship recognition is a devolved matter. This means that the decision whether to 
introduce same-gender marriage falls to the Northern Ireland Assembly (located at Stormont Castle, Belfast) 
rather than the Westminster parliament (the same applies for the Scottish Parliament which introduced same-
gender marriage in Scotland in 2014). Despite overwhelming public support among the Northern Irish 
population, same-sex marriage has consistently been blocked by the region’s largest political group, the 
Democratic Unionist Party. See Same-sex marriage: Proposal Wins Assembly Majority but Fails over DUP 
Block, BBC (Nov. 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-34692546.    
20 ILGA-Europe, supra note 6.  
21 Portugal Parliament Overturns Veto on Adoption by Gay Couples, UK Reuters  (February 2016) 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-rights-portugal-adoption-idUKKCN0VJ1Z0 (accessed 28 February 2017). 
22 ILGA-Europe, supra note 6.  
23 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015).  
24 Nicholas Bamforth, Families but Not (yet) Marriages? Same-Sex Partners and the Developing 
European Convention "Margin of Appreciation,”  23 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 128 (2011); Paul Johnson, "The 
Kopf v. Austria25, and has been reaffirmed (with increasing intensity) in numerous subsequent opinions, 
including Gas & Dubois v. France,26, Hamalainen v. Finland,27 Oliari v. Italy, 28 and Chapin & 
Charpentier v. France.29 The Strasbourg court has stated that, while article 12 ECHR (the right to 
marry) is not inapplicable to LGB couples in all cases, given the lack of consensus surrounding gay 
marriage, States Parties currently retain the right to decide entry requirements for marital unions.30 In 
particular, the judges have emphasised that the wording and origins of article 12 ECHR (which provides 
that “[m]en and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family”) suggest a 
clear preference for opposite-gender unions.31  
 
  Numerous scholars have, however, criticised the existing case law as both historically 
inaccurate and inconsistent with the Convention’s wider protections against sexual orientation and 
gender discrimination.32 Paul Johnson suggests that “the qualification that men and women were 
entitled to equal rights as to marriage . . . can be understood as the outcome of the decision to give literal 
expression to the commitment to ensure gender equality in marriage.”33  While the travaux preparatoires 
for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which forms the basis of the Convention 
protections for marriage, suggest a clear intention to establish an expansive and non-discriminatory 
marriage right (with a specific desire to avoid Nazi era entry-requirements based on race and religion)34, 
there is no evidence that the ECHR drafters consciously decided to exclude marriage equality. The 
drafters may not have positively considered same-gender couples, but they also made no explicit 
statement against such relationships.  
 
B. Access to Civil Partnership   
                                                          
Choice of Wording Must Be Regarded as Deliberate": Same-Sex Marriage and Article 12 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 40 EUR. L. REV. 207, 207-11 (2015).  
25  53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2011). 
26 App. No. 25951/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R.  Mar. 15 2012).  
27 1 F.C.R. 379 (2015).  
28 40 B.H.R.C. 549.  
29 App. No. 40183/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 2016).  
30 Schalk & Kopf v. Austria,  53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, ¶61 (2011).  
31 Id. at 55.  
32  Fenwick, supra note 5, at 255-57; Loveday Hodson, A Marriage by Any Other Name – Schalk and Kopf v. 
Austria,  11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 170, 176-77 (2011);  Johnson, supra note 24, at207-08.  
33 Johnson, supra note 24, at 215.  
34 Rebecca Cook, International Protection of Women's Reproductive Rights, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 644, 
700 (1992); Bart van der Sloot, Between Fact and Fiction: An Analysis of the Case-law on Article 12 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 397, 404 (2014). 
 More than half of the jurisdictions across the Council of Europe offer same-gender civil 
partnerships.35 In many jurisdictions, such partnerships were introduced as an alternative to marriage 
and extended significant marriage-like rights, including pension guarantees, next-of-kin privileges, and 
tax benefits. In other countries, registered partnerships have a reduced status, and are not considered as 
parallel with marital unions. The European jurisdictions, which offer “marriage-like” civil or registered 
partnership structures include: Andorra, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Liechenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia, parts of Spain, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, Ruth Gaffney-Rhys observes a unique legal situation whereby, 
following the introduction of marriage equality in 2013, same-gender couples (who may still form civil 
partnerships) now enjoy greater options to formalise their relationships than heterosexual couples (who 
may only enter a marriage).36 Announcing the results of a recent consultation, the British government 
declined to introduce civil partnership for heterosexual couples, citing a “lack of consensus on the way 
forward.”37 While the UK Court of Appeal has recently suggested that the current inequality may 
constitute sexual orientation discrimination against opposite-gender couples, a majority of the justices 
favoured affording Parliament additional time to rectify the situation.38 The European jurisdictions that 
offer same-gender couples “non-marriage-like” civil or registered partnerships include: Andorra, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Slovenia, and parts of Spain.  
 
  A common (and unfortunate) feature of Europe’s civil partnership regimes – both marriage-
like and otherwise – is that, where the partnership structure does differ from marital unions, it generally 
relates to parenting rights.39 In Slovenia, registered partnership shares all the features of marriage, 
except for the right to jointly adopt.40 As already noted, Italy’s Civil Unions Act 2016 faced an unlikely 
defeat in the national parliament until the government agreed to exclude adoption entitlements for civil 
partners. Such rules appear to be compatible with the European Convention as the ECtHR has held that, 
where State Parties extend formal recognition to same-gender couples, they retain a margin of discretion 
                                                          
35 Oliari,  40 B.H.R.C.  at 178; ILGA-Europe, supra note 6. 
36 Ruth Gaffney-Rhys, Same-Sex Marriage but not Mixed-Sex Partnerships: Should the Civil Partnership Act 
2004 Be Extended to Opposite-Sex Couples?, 26 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 173, 174 (2014).  
37 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): Report on 
Conclusions, 21 (London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2014).  
38 Steinfeld & Keidan v. Secretary of State for Educ., [2017] EWCA (Civ) 81, see judgments of Lord Justice 
Beatsen and Lord Justice Briggs at ¶¶ 133–75.  
39 ILGA-Europe, supra note 6. . 
40 Marja Novak, Slovenia Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, but not Adoption, HUFFINGTON POST QUEER VOICES  (Feb. 
24, 2017),  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/slovenia-same-sex-marriage-law_us_58ac9f90e4b0e784faa257e0.  
in determining the exact status, including ancillary rights, to be attached to any non-marriage 
relationship structures.41 Austria currently has the unique distinction of being the only European 
jurisdiction to permit joint adoption rights, while limiting marital unions to opposite-gender couples.  
 
While there is a clear political movement towards (at least) basic legal recognition for same-gender 
relationships across Europe, it remains uncertain whether the European Convention specifically 
provides for an obligation to recognise. In Schalk and Kopf, the European Court of Human Rights did 
not consider whether Austria’s refusal  to provide any civil recognition, in addition to prohibiting 
marriage equality, was incompatible with the ECHR. Subsequent to the applicant’s petition, the 
Austrian government had introduced an alternative form of relationship status.42 However, in 
Valianatos v. Greece, the Court did hold that while, under article 8 ECHR (private and family life), 
Greece had no obligation to enact civil partnership. Article 8, read in conjunction with article 14 ECHR 
(non-discrimination), prevented the introduction of non-marriage recognition which, without 
particularly weighty reasons, excluded couples on the basis of sexual orientation.43 In Oliari v. Italy, 
the ECtHR held that Italy had a positive responsibility to permit same-gender registered partnerships 
(even where opposite-gender partnership did not yet exist).44 However, Andy Hayward cautions that 
Oliari may not herald a new Europe-wide right for all LGB couples.45 Rather, the Court’s opinion 
narrowly responds to the particular complexities of Italian political and social culture – numerous 
national court judgments requiring civil unions, the Government’s consistent failure to consider public 
support – which ultimately justified an obligation to formal relationship recognition.46 As Judges 
Mahoney, Tsotsoria and Vehabovic expressly observed in their concurring opinion, the majority were 
“careful to limit their finding of the existence of a positive obligation to Italy and to ground their 
conclusion on a combination of factors not necessarily found in other Contracting States.”47  
 
C. Access to Adoption Rights – Joint Adoption and Second-Parent Adoption Rights   
 
For Europe’s non-biological same-gender parents, formalising one’s relationship does not 
necessarily guarantee automatic parenting rights. In most cases, the non-biological parent will still have 
                                                          
41 Schalk & Kopf,  53 Eur. H.R. Rep.  20, at ¶¶ 108–09; Oliari,  40 B.H.R.C. 549, at ¶ 177. 
42 Schalk & Kopf,  53 Eur. H.R. Rep.. 20, at ¶¶ 104–10.  
43  59 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12,  ¶ 92 (2014). 
44 40 B.H.R.C. 549, at ¶¶ 185–87.  
45 Andy Hayward, Same-Sex Registered Partnerships – A Right to be Recognized?, 75CAMBRIDGE L. J. 27, 29-
30 (2016).  
46 Id.  
47 40 B.H.R.C. 549, concurring Opinion of Judge Mahoney, Joined by Judges Tsotsoria and Vehabovic, at 10. 
to take further steps (although, those steps will often only be possible after entering a marriage or civil 
partnership). Across the Council of Europe, fifteen jurisdictions permit same-gender couples to jointly 
adopt children: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.48 Seventeen jurisdictions 
permit a same-gender spouse or partner to adopt their partner’s child (so called “second-parent” 
adoption).49  
 
  The European Court of Human Rights has long recognised that article 8 of the Convention does 
not confer a right to adopt.50 Brian Tobin has criticised what he considers to be an “inconsistent and 
somewhat incoherent approach in cases where restrictive second-parent adoption laws were challenged 
by heterosexual cohabiting couples and same-sex partners.”51  In Gas and Dubois v. France, the Court 
held that there was no unlawful discrimination where French legislation restricted second-parent 
adoption to married heterosexual spouses.52 As noted above, the ECtHR considers that entering into a 
marriage creates a special status for individuals, which means that they are not in a sufficiently 
comparable situation with unmarried couples – heterosexual or homosexual – for discrimination (within 
the meaning of article 14 ECHR) to arise.53 There could be no indirect discrimination (i.e. as all same-
gender couples are excluded from marriage, the French rules are more likely to burden LGB persons) 
because State Parties retained a wide margin of discretion whether to permit LGB marriages.54 
However, in the subsequent decision, X v. Austria, the ECtHR accepted that, where a jurisdiction opens 
second-parent adoption to unmarried opposite-gender couples, it cannot, absent particularly weighty 
reasons, omit same-gender partners.55 Similarly, where adoption is open to single persons, a State party 
cannot withhold permission to adopt simply on the basis of an applicant’s sexual orientation.56   
 
D. Medically Assisted Insemination  
 
                                                          
48 ILGA-Europe, supra note 6.   
49 Id. Those countries include: Andorra, Austria, Finland, Slovenia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. 
50 Di Lazzaro v. Italy, App. No. 31924/96, Eur. Comm’n  Hum. Rts. (July 10, 2017).  
51 Brian Tobin, The European Court of Human Rights' Inconsistent and Incoherent Approach to Second-Parent 
Adoption,  1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 59, 59 (2017).  
52 App. No. 25951/07, Eur. Ct. H.R.  (Mar. 15, 2012). 
53 Id. at ¶ 68.  
54 Id. at ¶¶ 66-71.  
55  57 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, at ¶¶ 105–53 (2013).  
56  47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21 (2008).   
Throughout Europe, LGB parents, particularly couples consisting of two female-identified 
persons, often create families using medically assisted insemination (MAI).57 Twelve European 
countries allow same-gender partners to access MAI as a partnership: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.58  
 
  Under section 42 of the UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (“2008 Act”), 
where a woman, “at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her artificial 
insemination,” is either married to, or in a civil partnership with, another female individual, the latter 
person is “to be treated as a parent of the child unless it is shown that she did not consent to the placing 
in [the recipient of treatment] of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her artificial insemination.”59 
Sections 43 and 44 of the 2008 Act provide that, if assisted reproduction takes place in circumstances 
where no man (by virtue of being a husband) or woman (by virtue of being a wife or civil partner) is 
treated as the child’s parent, another woman (with whom the recipient of the reproductive assistance is 
not within restricted degrees of relationship) may be treated as the parent where (a) both that other 
woman and the recipient consent thereto, (b) the consent has not been withdrawn and (c) the recipient 
has not consented to another party being treated as the parent. Julie McCandless and Sally Sheldon have 
criticised the 2008 Act for reinforcing an outdated (and often artificial) sexual family model. While the 
2008 Act opens the possibility for two parents with the same legal gender, it nevertheless affirms that a 
child can only have one legal “mother.”60 Irrespective of the actual role that she adopts within her child’s 
life (e.g., taking responsibility for tasks that have stereotypically been associated with motherhood), a 
woman recognised under sections 43 and 44 of the 2008 Act can only enjoy the status of “female 
parent.”61 
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 Twenty-five European jurisdictions permit single persons (irrespective of sexual orientation) to 
avail of MAI: Armenia,  Belarus, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Latvia, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Ukraine, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.62  
 
 
II. Respect for Family Life  
 
 
A. Family Life Under Article 8 ECHR  
 
 
Within the Council of Europe, article 8 ECHR plays a particularly important role in protecting the 
rights attached to family life. Article 8(1) provides that “everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence.” Under article 8(2), the right to private and family 
life may be qualified “in accordance with the law,” where such limitation is “necessary in a democratic 
society” and serves a legitimate aim, including “the interests of national security,” “public safety or the 
economic wellbeing of the country,” “the prevention of disorder or crime,” “the protection of health or 
morals,” and “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”  
 
The European Court has stated that, while protection from arbitrary state interference is the essential 
object of article 8 ECHR, the protection of family life is also capable of giving rise to positive 
obligations.63 In Nazarenko v. Russia, the ECtHR observed that “[t]hese obligations may involve the 
adoption of measures designed to secure respect for family life, even in the sphere of relations between 
individuals, including both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudicatory and enforcement 
machinery protecting individuals’ rights and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific 
steps.”64 According to Conor O’Mahoney, the recognition of positive obligations may be particularly 
necessary “in cases involving non-traditional de facto families,” including same-gender parents and 
their non-biological children.65  For these individuals, particularly in a twenty-first century context, the 
legal discrimination that they experience is decreasingly related to positive state interventions from 
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which both parents and children must be protected under article 8 ECHR. Rather, for non-normative 
families, the difficulties they encounter more typically arise from the “absence of [a] legal framework 
providing recognition and protection of their family life.”66 In seeking to vindicate their family life 
under article 8 ECHR, these individuals are effectively asking for their existence to be legally 
acknowledged.67  
 
In the landmark decision of Marckx .v Belgium, the ECtHR held that “respect for family life implies 
in particular . . . the existence in domestic law of legal safeguards that render possible as from the 
moment of birth the child’s integration in his family.”68 Caroline Sörgjerd observes that the “distinction 
between private life and family life”69 relates to the level of protection guaranteed by the Convention.70 
In many respects, “family life” guarantees offer enhanced rights, including the opportunity to live 
together, the benefit of national legal protections and access to social benefits.71  
 
 
B. LGB Families Come Within the Scope of “Family Life”  
 
The European Court of Human Rights has adopted an expansive definition of family life. Going 
beyond the traditional married nuclear family, article 8 ECHR embraces wider “social, moral or cultural 
relations,” as well as “interests of a material kind.”72 In Zaunegger v. Germany, the Court noted that 
“the existence or non-existence of ‘family life’ within the meaning of article 8 is essentially a question 
of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties.”73 In Zaunegger, a case 
concerned with fathers’ rights outside of marriage, the Court placed special emphasis on “the 
demonstrable interest in and commitment by the [parent] to the child both before and after the birth.”74 
 
In a number of cases, the ECtHR has affirmed the “family life” protections of de facto families 
living outside formal legal and biological structures. In judgments, such as Moretti and Benedetti v. 
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Italy75 and Kopf and Liberda v. Austria,76 the Court recognised the possibility for family life between 
“a foster family and a fostered child who had lived together for many months.”77  Of particular relevance 
to the question of non-biological same-gender parents, the Court focused on the fact that a “close 
emotional bond had developed between the foster family and the child, similar to the one between 
parents and children, and that the foster family had behaved in every respect like the child’s parents.”78 
In Menesson v. France, the Strasbourg judges also found family life where two heterosexual parents 
were raising two children born using the father’s sperm, but also with the benefit of a female egg donor 
and female surrogate.79  
 
In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights has recognised the article 8 ECHR rights 
of gay, lesbian and bisexual couples. Through a landmark statement, delivered in Schalk and Kopf, the 
Court observed that:  
 
it [is] artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex 
couple cannot enjoy ‘family life’ for the purposes of Article 8. Consequently, the 
relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto 
partnership, falls within the notion of ‘family life’, just as the relationship of a different-
sex couple in the same situation would.80   
 
In subsequent cases, the ECtHR has elaborated upon, and expanded, its Schalk and Kopf 
reasoning. In Valianatos v. Greece, the Court held that stable same-gender couples fall within the notion 
of family life even where, “for professional and social reasons,” the partners do not live together: “the 
fact of not cohabiting does not deprive the couples concerned of the stability which brings them within 
the scope of family life within the meaning of Article 8.”81 Furthermore, having previously held that 
transgender parents, who identify with opposite genders, enjoy the protection of family life,82 the Court 
has recently expanded its case law to equally include those transgender families where both parents 
identify with the same gender.83 At the national level, the fact that unmarried same-gender couples fall 
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within the notion of family life has been recognised by courts in, among other jurisdictions, 
Germany,84,the United Kingdom85 and Spain.86   
 
In Gas and Dubois – where an unmarried couple were raising a child, which one partner had 
conceived through assisted reproduction – the ECtHR ruled that, although unmarried couples were not 
entitled to second-parent adoption, Gas, Dubois, and their child undoubtedly enjoyed “family life.”87 
This was so irrespective of whether Gas had any legal or biological connection to the child. A similar 
result was achieved in X v. Austria, where the first applicant enjoyed family life with her female partner, 
the third applicant, and the latter’s child from a previous heterosexual relationship.88 In both cases, 
while the same-gender couple might not have been entitled to the specific rights reserved for marital 
unions, there was a positive obligation on the French and Austrian states to adopt appropriate measures 
to preserve and reinforce existing family life. In the context of non-biological parents, and post-
relationship custody disputes, there is an arguable case that, irrespective of biological and legal ties, if 
the parent has established family life with the child(ren) being raised within the relationship, there is a 
requirement that state authorities facilitate – for the benefit of the child and the non-biological parent – 
the continuing enjoyment of family ties.  
 
C. Margin of Appreciation 
 
As noted, the right to respect for family life under article 8 ECHR is not absolute. It may be limited 
“in accordance with the law” for a number of “necessary” reasons, including “public safety,” “the 
protection of health or morals” and “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” In general, 
State parties must seek to strike a proportional balance between the rights of the individual and the 
interests of affected third persons or the wider community.89 In making that determination, countries 
enjoy a margin of appreciation90, which will widen or narrow depending on a number of factors (many 
of which have a direct bearing on the question of non-biological parents).  
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 State parties enjoy a wider margin of appreciation in respecting family life where, first,there is a lack 
of consensus throughout the Council of Europe, and, second, national law or practices concerns 
economic and social strategy.  The European Court of Human Rights is less likely to condemn state 
restrictions on family life if there is little agreement among European nations on the legitimacy of such 
restrictions.91 The Court is particularly loathe to substitute its own judgment for national decision-
making processes where there is a question of ethical or moral judgement.92 Perhaps the paradigm 
modern example of consensus review can be seen in the ECtHR’s consistent unwillingness to declare a 
right to same-gender marriage under the Convention.93 In the recent Oliari judgment, having regard to 
the prior case law, the Strasbourg judges dismissed the claimants’ marriage-focused arguments as 
“manifestly ill-founded.”94 Where only twelve jurisdictions have equal marital laws across the Council 
of Europe, it would be premature (and, as noted above, institutionally detrimental) for the Court to 
expand the definition of marriage in all other (thirty-five) State Parties. In the same way, the question 
of same-gender parenting rights remains particularly sensitive across the Council of Europe, with 
different states adopting radically different positions in terms of adoption and responsibility 
entitlements. It is therefore likely that the Court would be less likely to intervene where national rules 
interfere with non-biological parents’ parental rights.  
 
  State Parties also enjoy a wider margin of appreciation where they implement social or 
economic strategies.95 The Court shows greater reluctance to intervene where the result is a significant 
burden on the national treasury or where any judgment would short-circuit ongoing national debates on 
social policy. In A, B and C v. Ireland,96 despite “a clear consensus among European states on the 
question of how to balance the mother's rights with those of the foetus,”97 the ECtHR refused to 
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“decisively narrow” Ireland’s margin of appreciation to legislate on the socially contentious issue of 
abortion.98 Since adoption and custody rights may also fall within the scope of social policy, it is 
arguable that the Court would offer a wider margin of appreciation in determining non-biological 
parents’ rights.  
 
  On the other hand, national authorities enjoy a narrower margin of appreciation in respecting 
family life where state action impinges upon an “important facet of an individual’s existence or 
identity.”99 A restriction on family life, which limits a core aspect of a person’s identity, will encourage 
the European Court of Human Rights to apply stricter scrutiny. In Goodwin v. United Kingdom, a 2002 
case, the United Kingdom’s failure to recognise Christine Goodwin’s preferred female gender was a 
significant interference with an important facet of her identity, and thus the court extended only a narrow 
margin of appreciation.100 In Menesson v. France, the ECtHR held that “an essential aspect of the 
identity of individuals is at stake where the legal parent-child relationship is concerned.”101 Thus, “[t]he 
margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State . . . needs to be reduced.”102 State action, which 
limits the family life between non-biological parents and their children, restricts that parent’s identity 
and should require the Court to undertake a more rigorous review.  
 
One final consideration is how the particular type of proceeding may influence the margin afforded 
to State Parties. Sommerfeld v. Germany suggests that, where national authorities are resolving a 
custody dispute, they generally enjoy a wider margin of appreciation.103 However, that margin 
significantly narrows where there are “any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by those 
authorities on parental rights of access, and as regards any legal safeguards designed to secure an 
effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life.”104  
 
D. Aims of Article 8 ECHR  
 
In determining the proportionality of a restriction on family life, a primary consideration is whether 
the State’s action pursues a legitimate aim. Limiting the rights of non-biological parents does not satisfy 
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the requirements of article 8 ECHR if it is not necessary to achieve an appropriate state interest.105 In 
seeking to justify interferences with family life, State Parties have, with varying degrees of success, 
claimed to promote a spectrum of goals which legitimise curbing article 8 ECHR protections.  
 
1. Protecting the Traditional Family  
 
  In the sphere of LGB rights, particularly discrimination against non-heterosexual partners and 
parents, State Parties have rationalised unequal treatment as preserving traditional family structures. In 
Karner v Austria, a case concerned with tenancy succession rights for same-gender couples, the ECtHR 
accepted that “protection of the family in the traditional sense is, in principle, a weighty and legitimate 
reason which might justify a difference in treatment”106 based on sexual orientation. Thus, to the extent 
that providing express legal rights for non-biological same-gender parents may undermine the 
traditional heteronormative family model, the existing case law (at least facially) would support national 
restrictions.  
 
In recent years, however, the Strasbourg judges have more strictly reviewed the question of 
whether LGB rights do weaken traditional family structures, and whether state intervention actually 
promotes (or is necessary to promote) the orthodox family model. In Karner, while the ECtHR conceded 
that protecting the traditional heterosexual family is a legitimate interest, the Court ultimately concluded 
that Austria had failed to prove that it was specifically necessary to exclude same-gender couples from 
tenancy succession rights in order to protect the traditional family.107 In Karner, it was clear that tenancy 
succession rights for same gender couples would have no effect on traditional families. There was no 
question that, because the State recognised such rights, heterosexual Austrian couples were now going 
to forgo marriage in favour of homosexual cohabitation. It was clear, therefore, that the exclusion of 
tenancy succession rights was disproportionate and lacked an objective, or reasonable, justification.  
 
In Vallianatos, the majority held that, while the indirect strengthening of traditional marriage 
is a legitimate Convention aim, the Court will not automatically accept that a particular state law or 
policy pursues that goal.108 In Vallianatos, registered partnerships solidified the legal relationship of a 
child, born outside of wedlock, to both of his or her parents. The Greek government argued, therefore, 
that registered partnerships indirectly protected the institution of marriage because they ensured that 
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couples, who would otherwise choose to cohabit, do not marry simply to secure parent-child rights.109 
These considerations did not arise in the case of homosexual couples, who could not biologically 
reproduce, and therefore there were objective justifications for excluding same gender couples from the 
law. However, the Court noted that the Greek government had also extended registered partnership 
rights to heterosexual couples without children.110 Like gay and lesbian persons, there was no fear that 
these couples would only marry to secure their parent-child relationship yet they were still beneficiaries 
of registered partnerships. In such circumstances, there was a clear doubt as to the extent to which the 
total exclusion of homosexual couples was a real or necessary objective. 
 
The reasoning in both Karner and Vallianatos is instructive for the question of whether State 
Parties should extend greater parental rights to individuals who, with a same-gender partner, are raising 
non-biological children. The standard “traditional family” defence would suggest that, by reducing non-
heterosexual family rights to the greatest extent possible, national laws disincentive non-traditional 
family structures, prioritize heterosexual marriage relationships and encourage individuals into a 
socially optimal family model. However, as in Karner, such an argument would be intellectually weak 
(not to mention wholly removed from social reality). Severing the legal connection between gay, lesbian 
and bisexual parents and their non-biological children does not persuade such individuals to enter an 
opposite-gender heterosexual marriage. A woman, who cannot obtain legal rights over the children that 
she is raising with her female partner, will not disavow her identity and marry a man because she finds 
herself in legal limbo. Rather, instead of reinforcing the de facto social superiority of traditional 
families, the absence of LGB family rights has no appreciable impact on heterosexual marriage, but 
significantly impedes lesbian, gay and bisexual family life.   
 
 
2. Developing Family Ties  
 
In Kroon v. Netherlands, the ECtHR stated that “where the existence of a family tie with a child 
has been established, the State must act in a manner calculated to enable that tie to be developed and 
legal safeguards must be established.”111 In a series of cases, the Court has consistently affirmed that 
“the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other's company constitutes a fundamental element 
of family life, and domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the 
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right protected by Article 8 of the Convention.”112 Where a non-biological parent establishes a family 
tie with children raised in the family, article 8 may require state authorities, where the parents’ 
relationship terminates, to create sufficient legal structures for the continued development of the parent-
child ties.    
 
 
III. The Best Interests of the Child  
 
 
In Valianatos v. Greece and X v. Austria, the European Court of Human Rights stated that, when 
defining the contours of articles 8 and 14 ECHR, “[i]t goes without saying that the protection of the 
interests of the child is . . . a legitimate aim.”113 Across Europe, both at the national and supra-national 
levels, there is a general consensus that, for parent-child relationships, including the determination of 
status, responsibility and custody, the best interests of the child should be the “paramount” 
consideration. Under article 24(2) of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (given legal effect 
under the Treaty of Lisbon), “[i]n all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or 
private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration.”114  
 
In Plaza v. Poland, the ECtHR ruled that “in matters relating to their custody the interests of 
children are of paramount importance.”115 Similar sentiments have been expressed in Kearns v 
France116 (determining when a parent can revoke consent to adoption); Wagner and JMWL v 
Luxembourg117 (considering the legitimacy of a refusal to register a child born in a foreign country to a 
surrogate mother); and K and T v Finland118 (concerning the placement of children in state care). The 
best interests of the child (or the welfare of the child) is also the standard generally adopted by national 
legislation and case law across Europe (e.g. see Children’s Act 1989, s. 1 (UK); Civil Code, art. 1685 
(Germany); Civil Code, arts. 371-373 (France); decision of the Stockholm Court of Appeals, 7 October 
2014 (Sweden)).  
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 In determining the rights of non-biological same-gender parents, particularly as against the 
biological or legal parent of a child, policy makers and the courts should be primarily guided by the 
best interests of the young person. Where there is evidence that a child’s interests are best served 
through continued contact, or even continued residence, with a non-biological parent, the absence of a 
genetic or legal connection should not deter the court. Just as article 12 of the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child requires that a child’s best interests be determined through hearing the voice of the 
child, so too the ECtHR agrees that “as children mature and become, with the passage of time, able to 
formulate their own opinion on their contact with the parents, the courts should give due weight also to 
their views and feelings.”119   
  
The “best interests” principle can offer significant protection to individuals who, while 
engaging in full social parenting, do not share a biological link with their children. There are compelling 
reasons to believe that a presumption against the rights (e.g., contact, custody, shared parental 
responsibility)120 for non-biological parents does not serve the best interests of children. In its decision 
affirming the right to successive second-parent adoption (i.e. where a same-gender partner becomes a 
second legal parent to the other partner’s adopted child), the German Constitutional Court held that 
removing all rights from non-biological parents, upon the breakdown of a relationship, compromises a 
child’s “emotional attachment” and also increases both legal and financial insecurity.121  
 
One note of caution, however, relates to the fact that, while the ECtHR has a clear preference for 
“best interests” reasoning, it has not applied the principle consistently to LGB families. This reflects a 
much wider political phenomenon – noticeable both across Europe and beyond – where the protection 
of children has been consistently invoked to resist greater LGBT rights, both individually (e.g., specific 
custody determinations) and collectively (e.g., opposition to gay marriage and adoption rights).122 In 
dissenting from the majority judgment in Gas and Dubois, Judge Villiger referred to the negative effects 
which refusing joint parental rights would have on the couple’s child.123 However, Gas and Dubois v. 
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France,124 along with X v. Austria,125 is a primary example of an ECHR case in which, although the 
outcome of the litigation clearly would have significant impact for children, the Strasbourg judges failed 
to consider how the children’s best interests would be negatively affected by prohibiting greater parental 
rights.126 Indeed, even when the ECtHR has expressly used “best interests” analysis in its reasoning for 
LGBT considerations, there have been questions as to whether the standard was either objectively or 
appropriately applied. While, in Frette v. France127, the Court did make significant reference to “best 
interests,” the judges appeared to ignore the substantial body of evidence which already existed on the 
desirability of same-gender parenting.128  
 
 
IV. The Role of Biological Parenting  
 
 
Considering the paramountcy of “best interests” in parental rights decisions, what role should 
biological links play? In the highly-publicised United Kingdom decision, In Re G (Children), Baroness 
Hale, for the House of Lords, stated that, while child welfare was the ultimate determinant in allocating 
parenting responsibility and residence rights, “the fact that [the biological parent] [was] the natural 
mother of these children in every sense of that term . . . is undoubtedly an important and significant 
factor in determining what will be best for them now and in the future.”129 In Re G, their Lordships 
overturned a decision to award primary residence rights to the children’s non-biological same-gender 
parent. The decision was controversial and, among lower courts, led to a presumption that biological 
parents should be preferred in parental responsibility disputes.130 In 2009, the now UK Supreme Court 
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was required to intervene again and, with Lord Kerr giving judgment for the Court in Re B (a Child), 
affirmed that:  
 
All consideration of the importance of parenthood in private law disputes about residence 
must be firmly rooted in an examination of what is in the child’s best interests. This is the 
paramount consideration. It is only as a contributor to the child's welfare that parenthood 
assumes any significance. In common with all other factors bearing on what is in the best 
interests of the child, it must be examined for its potential to fulfil that aim. There are 
various ways in which it may do so, some of which were explored by Baroness Hale in In 
re G, but the essential task for the court is always the same.131 
 
The Spanish Supreme Court has come to a similar conclusion.132 In a case where two female 
partners were raising a child, conceived by one of the partners through donor insemination, the Court 
held that the biological mother could not block the child’s contact with her former partner. The parents 
and child were a de facto family and, having regard to the best interests of the child as the paramount 
consideration, it was appropriate that the non-biological mother be afforded the same rights as arise 
from the legal status of motherhood.133  
 
In Nazarenko v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights held that a male applicant, who 
had raised a child for a number of years before discovering that he was not the biological father, “must 
not be completely excluded from the child’s life.”134 Conversely, in Schneider v. Germany, the ECtHR 
stated that “a mere biological kinship between a natural parent and a child, without any further legal or 
factual elements indicating the existence of a close personal relationship, is insufficient to attract the 
protection of Article 8.”135  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has not yet addressed the specific issue of non-biological 
same-gender parents who, upon the dissolution of a relationship with their children’s biological parent, 
seek to maintain access to, and rights over, those children. Recognising the family life of same-gender 
couples, and specifically enhancing entitlements to both individual and second-parent adoptions, the 
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ECtHR has undoubtedly taken steps to ensure that gay, lesbian, and bisexual families are not total 
strangers to the law. In many respects, the Court’s recent progressive case law merely aligns with its 
consistent approach that national law should “take account of the social reality of the situation” in which 
individuals live.136 However, at the same time, the Strasbourg judges are increasingly aware of their 
own institutional (il)legitimacy, and on sensitive or moral issues, such as abortion and same-gender 
marriage, the ECtHR has been less willing to introduce radical reform. As this section of the article has 
illustrated, there is much in the ECtHR’s existing jurisprudence to support wider legal recognition for 
non-biological same-gender parents. Whether the judges would be willing to enact meaningful 
protections may ultimately rely more upon considerations of political science than legal analysis.    
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